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Since it dropped two nuclear bombs on Japan in 1945, the United States has sought 
to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. In the 1950s, it granted certain 
countries access to nuclear technology in exchange for a guarantee that it be used 
only for peaceful applications. In 1968, it worked with the United Kingdom and 
Soviet Union to offer this arrangement to the rest of the world through the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
The NPT has been highly successful. Within five years, 80 countries had signed and 
ratified the treaty, and by 1985, that number was 130. Two countries -– China and 
France -– refused to sign until 1992, while Israel, Indian and Pakistan still have not 
signed. Three countries –- Iran, Iraq and Libya -– are known to have signed and then 
cheated, while one country -– North Korea -– signed and then withdrew in 2003.
In this project, Verdier set out to explain why the NPT has been so successful. 
Previous literature on the NPT focused on the few countries that didn’t sign or that 
cheated. Instead, Verdier focuses on countries that did sign, explaining their 
actions as a contract between the principal, a cartel of nuclear states, and agents, 
all non-nuclear states. 
Using game theory, Verdier argues that the object is to maximize non-proliferation 
by promising to reward signatories and threatening to punish non-signatories and 
cheaters. He then makes predictions about which countries were likely to sign and 
when. Finally, he is testing those predictions on a panel of all countries from 1968-
2002.
This research feeds into a larger project on international economic incentives and 
sanctions whose aim is to pinpoint the right mix of carrots and sticks for countries 
to achieve their goals in the international arena. It also contributes to a growing 
literature applying game theory to the study of international institutions. 
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